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ABSTRACT  
Objective To note the frequency of discussions and disputes about tobacco control measures at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) before and after the coming into force of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). To review trends or patterns in the positions taken by 
members of the WTO with respect to tobacco control measures. To discuss possible explanations 
for these observed trends/patterns.    
Methods We gathered data on tobacco related disputes in the WTO since its establishment in 
1995 and its forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), prior- and post-
FCTC. We also looked at debates on tobacco control measures within the WTO more broadly. 
To this end, we classified and coded the positions of WTO member states during discussions on 
tobacco control and the FCTC, from 1995 until 2013, within the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Committee and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Council.  
Results There is a growing interest within the WTO for tobacco related issues and opposition to 
tobacco control measures is moving away from high-income countries towards low(er) income 
countries.  
Conclusion The growing prominence of tobacco issues in the WTO can be attributed at least in 
part to the fact that during the last decade tobacco firms have been marginalised from the 
domestic policy-making process in many countries, which has forced them to look for other 
ways and forums to influence decision-making. Furthermore, the finding that almost all recent 
opposition within the WTO to stronger tobacco regulations came from developing countries is 
consistent with a relative shift of transnational tobacco companies’ lobbying efforts from 
developed to developing countries. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Trade issues have long been recognised as important for tobacco control[1-3], and there have 
been a number of tobacco-related disputes within the WTO. The Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) was adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2003 and entered 
into force on 27th February 2005[4]. The FCTC sets out obligations and provides clear guidance 
for its 180 States Parties on a series of (mainly demand side) tobacco control measures. 
However, following a number of disagreements over the inclusion of a possible clause in the 
FCTC giving it precedence over World Trade Organisation (WTO) or other trade law in the 
event of a conflict, a compromise was reached during FCTC negotiations whereby no explicit 
reference was made to the relationship between tobacco control and international trade law[5]. 
The first paragraph of the preamble states that the Parties to the FCTC are “determined to give 
priority to their right to protect public health”[4]. Article 2.2 of the FCTC may give it priority 
over treaties concluded subsequent to it, and customary international law may give the FCTC 
priority over treaties concluded earlier than it, but doubt remains as to the likely outcomes of 
disputes involving a conflict between trade and health concerns[6]. An important dispute 
concerning tobacco products is currently under way within the WTO, where a number of 
countries have complained about the adoption of plain packaging requirements by Australia[7-8].  
 In this article, we review the positions taken by members of the WTO on tobacco control 
measures in the post-FCTC period, not just in formal disputes but also in discussions within 
relevant WTO forums, notably the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee and the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council, in order to identify trends and 
patterns.   
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METHODS 
Data gathering was carried out in the following steps. We first identified formal GATT (1947-
1995) and WTO (1995-2013) disputes, prior- and post-FCTC, by searching the relevant WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) data bases at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm, under the subject categories of 
“cigarettes” and “tobacco” (see Table 1 for an overview).  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In a next step we classified and coded the positions of each WTO Member State during 
discussions on tobacco control and the FCTC from 1995 until 2013. We focused specifically on 
the two key WTO bodies where tobacco control measures are discussed. First, the TBT 
Committee, which looks at whether technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures introduced by a country are discriminatory and/or create (unnecessary) obstacles to 
trade. A typical TBT issue related to trade in tobacco products is whether regulations on plain 
packaging create unnecessary hurdles to trade and are more trade-restrictive than ‘necessary’ to 
fulfil the legitimate objective of protecting the health of a country’s citizens. Second, the TRIPS 
Council, which deals with all kinds of issues related to the protection of intellectual property 
rights in the multilateral trading system, including trademarks, patents and copyright provisions. 
A key example of a TRIPS concern in the field of tobacco control is how far the introduction of 
plain packaging places unjustifiable hindrances on the usage of tobacco-related trademarks.  
Both the TBT Committee and the TRIPS Council were established in 1995; hence our 
focus on the 1995-2013 period. To gather data on the TBT Committee, we searched the “specific 
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trade concerns” section in the TBT database on the WTO website (tbtims.wto.org). Interventions 
by countries which are in opposition to specific measures are recorded in this database. 
Interventions which are in favour of or in defence of those measures are not recorded as a 
“specific trade concern, but this information is recorded in the minutes of the TBT Committee 
and available elsewhere at the WTO website	  
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm). We found that issues related to tobacco 
and/or cigarettes were not raised in the TBT Committee until 1997 (Thai ingredient disclosure) 
and then not again until 2007 (tracking system, not health related). For the TRIPS Council we 
consulted http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm#issues and found that 
Tobacco control measures were first raised within the Council in 2011 (Plain packaging).  
Based on this information, we coded Member States positions as follows: a) “opposed” 
where the minutes reflected a position in opposition to a tobacco control measure (TRIPS), or if 
they were identified as having a specific trade concern in the TBT database; b) “supported” 
where the minutes reflected a position in support (TRIPS and TBT); and c) “other” if the position 
articulated in the minute was neither clearly supportive nor not supportive (see Table 2 for 
examples of texts indicating the three positions). Moreover, in order to compare the number of 
members concerned about TBT issues related to tobacco with the number of members concerned 
about all other issues, we searched the TBT section at the WTO website at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_work_docs_e.htm.  
Finally, we gathered the following additional data on WTO Member States: FCTC 
membership (at http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en) and World Bank developmental 
status (at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups). Regarding the latter, the 
World Bank distinguishes between Low-income (LI) economies (with a Gross National Income 
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(GNI) per capita of $1,045 or less); Lower-middle-income (LMI) economies (GNI per capita 
between $1,046 and $4,125); Upper-middle-income (UMI) economies (GNI per capita between 
$4,126 and $12,745);  and, finally, High-income (HI) economies (with a GNI per capita of 
$12,746 or more). We follow this categorization throughout this paper, although at times we 
group the LI, LMI and UMI economies together and refer to them as ‘developing countries,’ 
while HI economies may sometimes be referred to as ‘developed countries.’  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
RESULTS 
Our data show, first of all, that tobacco control is a much debated topic within the WTO. Of the 
15 most discussed issues within the TBT Committee between 1995 and 2013 – as measured by 
the number of WTO member countries that raised concerns about the particular issue during this 
period – six issues were related to tobacco control (see Table 3). Moreover, tobacco control 
policies have also been the subject of some high profile formal WTO dispute settlement cases 
(see Table 1 for an overview). Overall, there have been eleven WTO disputes about tobacco 
and/or cigarettes, of which ten were launched after the signing of the FCTC in 2003, while there 
were three disputes during the GATT-era. The most prominent and heavily debated WTO 
dispute settlement cases relating to tobacco are without doubt the five cases brought in 2012 and 
2013 by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia and Ukraine against Australia’s plain 
packaging rules. Note that in May 2015, Ukraine asked for its dispute proceedings with Australia 
to be suspended “with a view to finding a mutually agreed solution”[9].   
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Another interesting finding is that the importance of tobacco related issues within the 
WTO is a relatively recent phenomenon. The data on the issues with the greatest number of 
WTO members raising concerns at the TBT Committee shows that all debates on tobacco control 
policies took place since 2011 (see Table 3), while more than half of all the formal dispute 
settlement complaints launched in the entire GATT/WTO history involving tobacco were 
launched in the period since 2010 (Table 1). 
A third noteworthy observation, based on our data, is that almost all recent opposition 
within the WTO against the strengthening of tobacco regulations came from developing 
countries. This is true for the formal WTO dispute settlement cases, as well as for the debates in 
the TBT committee. Table 1 reveals that all recent dispute settlement cases, against countries 
introducing (stronger) tobacco control policies, were indeed brought by upper-middle-income 
(UMI) countries like Cuba and the Dominican Republic or lower-middle-income (LMI) 
countries such as Honduras, Indonesia, the Philippines and Ukraine. Figure 1, illustrates that 
opposition in the TBT Committee and TRIPS Council on tobacco control related issues also 
came predominantly from developing countries. Most active in this regard were the same UMI 
and LMI countries that launched the aforementioned WTO disputes, complemented by UMI 
countries like Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Turkey, as well as the LMI countries 
Nicaragua, Nigeria and Zambia. Some low-income (LI) countries were also very active: Kenya, 
Malawi and in particular Zambia. Taken together, developing countries opposed tobacco control 
polices three times more often than developed countries, while they hardly ever spoke out in 
favour of strong tobacco policies (see Figure 1). Among developed countries, such support for 
strong tobacco control policies within the TBT Committee and TRIPS Council was more 
common. As Figure 1 shows, high-income (HI) countries frequently supported tougher tobacco 
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regulations, while they only occasionally raised opposition towards such measures. In fact, 
developed countries supported tobacco control policies twice as often as they opposed them. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
What is more, if one looks at the frequency with  which countries raise concerns about 
tobacco related issues in the TBT committee and compares this to their interventions on all other 
issues within the committee, as we do in Figure 2, another striking difference between developed 
and developing countries becomes apparent. On average 23% of all oppositional interventions by 
developing countries in the TBT committee are related to tobacco control. This percentage gets 
higher the lower the income of the country in question: 13% for UMI countries, 23% for LMI 
countries and 31% for LI countries (see Figure 2). For some LI countries this percentage is even 
as high as 100% (i.e. Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda). The same 
counts for some LMI countries such as Honduras, Nicaragua, Nigeria and the UMI country 
Macedonia. The number of tobacco-related concerns raised as a percentage of all TBT 
interventions by developed countries, however , is negligible (i.e. 2%). For instance, just 3 out of 
196 (2%) concerns raised in the TBT committee by the EU, and 2 out of 169 (1%) by the US, 
were related to tobacco control. Most other developed countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Norway and South Korea) never raised concerns about tobacco control policies at all.    
 
[Figure 2 here] 
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DISCUSSION  
As shown above, tobacco control debates play a prominent role in the context of the WTO and 
have become particularly important in recent years. How can we explain this ‘sudden’ 
prominence of tobacco issues in the WTO? Part of the explanation may lie with the fact that – 
partly catalysed by the FCTC – there has been a clear rise in the number of tobacco control 
measures being adopted worldwide, which in turn has generated increasing debate between pro- 
and anti-tobacco control forces in different political and institutional settings, including the 
WTO. Yet, this is only part of the story. To understand the surge in tobacco control issues raised 
at the WTO we also have to take into account that during the last decade or so tobacco firms 
have been marginalised from the domestic policy-making process in many (particularly high 
income) countries, which has forced them to look for other (more indirect) ways and forums to 
influence decision-making. Given the transnational nature of the tobacco industry and the 
internationalisation of policy-making, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have ample 
opportunities to find alternative venues to further their corporate interests. A particularly suitable 
venue in this regard is the WTO.  Whilst the WTO offers several ways for firms to influence 
policy-making, they cannot initiate disputes with governments directly, as they can under the 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Philip Morris is already pursuing disputes against the 
Australian and Uruguayan governments under the ISDS clauses of two separate BITs[10,11]. 
Nevertheless, research has shown that firms play a key role in convincing governments to file 
complaints at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body or instigating governments to raise issues at 
the various WTO committees[12-14].  
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In the past, most objections against tobacco control policies in the WTO or via GATT 
came from developed countries as a result of lobbying by TTCs. The high profile GATT case 
brought by the US on behalf of American tobacco companies against Thailand in 1989 is a case 
in point[15] (see Table 1). However, as shown above, over time WTO related action against 
tobacco control moved from high income countries towards low(er) income countries. This is 
particularly surprising given that developing countries generally are under-represented in the 
WTO disputes process, with up to 80% of all disputes initiated by high income countries[16-19]. 
The poorest countries in the WTO system have previously been described as ‘almost completely 
disengaged from enforcement of their market access rights through formal dispute litigation’[20].  
How can we account for the shift to developing countries in anti-tobacco control actions 
in the WTO? One possibility is that TTCs have shifted their lobbying efforts from developed to 
developing countries. This is likely given that, as mentioned before, TTCs increasingly face 
ever-tougher tobacco control policies in developed countries and have even been excluded from 
policy-making processes in a number of high-income countries. Whilst they retain influence in 
the latter and continue to lobby there, their legitimacy has been damaged by a growing awareness 
of past deception[21] and of the health risks of smoking, leading in some cases to a loss of 
‘insider’ status and restrictions on their access to policy-makers[22]. Furthermore, the promotion 
of tobacco interests via trade agreements has become increasingly contentious in high-income 
countries. As early as 1992, in reaction to the aggressive pursuance of tobacco interests in East 
Asia, the contradiction between increasingly strong domestic tobacco control measures and the 
promotion of tobacco exports abroad was considered by the US General Accounting Office[23, 
24]. In 1997, the Doggett Amendment was passed by the US congress, barring personnel from 
the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State from promoting tobacco abroad, a provision 
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extended to all US executive branch agencies by President Clinton in 2001[24]. Whilst in 
practice the US has continued to act to liberalise tobacco markets[25], there has been renewed 
pressure to exclude tobacco from current trade negotiations such as that for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership agreement [26, 27].   
Whilst TTCs can and do continue to press their interests in high-income countries, in this 
context it is a rational strategy for them to turn to lower-income countries to represent their 
interests via an organisation like the WTO, where any member state can initiate a dispute or raise 
a concern. This is in line with other research on firm lobbying in the context of WTO dispute 
settlement. Typically, firms instigate their domestic government to file an official WTO 
complaint, or to take a stance within a committee, against a foreign country. However, 
increasingly firms also push foreign governments to stand up against their home country (or 
other third countries) in cases where they put in place trade restrictive measures. Research shows 
that firms pursuing such a strategy of transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping in the 
context of WTO dispute settlement “are generally multinational firms sourcing from abroad or 
firms with foreign subsidiaries, that are confronted with an unresponsive home government and 
use the opportunities of the multiple venues available within the institutions of the multilateral 
trading system to try and obtain [favourable] policies”[13]. A key reason for a government to be 
unresponsive to the demands of a firm is if that firm “produces politically sensitive or 
controversial products (e.g. products with possible negative effects on people’s health or the 
environment), which means that…politicians may see it as a political risk to give in to [the 
demands of the firm]”[13]. This logic would seem to apply to TTCs and their decision to shift 
their attention and lobbying from high-income to low(er)-income countries in trade matters. This 
is especially so since a relative lack of policy coherence between government departments in 
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low-income countries[28] may make it easier for companies to lobby there. In particular, a lack 
of coordination between health and trade ministries may mean that lobbyists need only convince 
relatively few officials in the trade ministry of their case, potentially resulting in a position at the 
WTO that does not necessarily represent the view of the government as a whole.  
A further possible reason for the shift from high-income countries to lower-income 
countries opposing tobacco control could be that the countries in question are important tobacco 
exporters and hence may benefit economically from the lifting of trade barriers on tobacco 
products elsewhere. To be sure, some of the most vocal opponents of tobacco control policies in 
the WTO are indeed important tobacco producers and exporters. Indonesia for instance is the 
world’s 4th most important tobacco producer and 12th on the list of most important tobacco 
exporters. Tobacco production and exports in/from some other active anti-tobacco control 
countries like the Philippines and Ukraine are also substantial. However, countries like the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Guatemala – all actively opposing tobacco control policies – 
seem to have no clear and direct stake in WTO action against tobacco control, as their tobacco 
production and exports figures are negligible[29]. What is more, none of the countries that 
launched a WTO dispute settlement case against Australia’s plain packaging rules (see Table 1) 
is actually exporting any substantial amount of tobacco products to Australia. In fact, export 
figures for most of these countries are close to zero. Only Indonesia exports some tobacco 
products to Australia, but still less than 1% of its total tobacco exports[30].   
   This lack of a clear pattern of economic interests among countries opposing tobacco 
control policies at the WTO lends support to the proposition that TTCs are exerting influence. 
Indeed, an explicit link between TTCs and countries initiating the WTO dispute with Australia is 
the payment of disputing countries’ legal fees by the TTCs. Philip Morris International has 
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acknowledged that it is paying the law firm Sidley Austin to represent the Dominican Republic, 
whilst British American Tobacco (BAT) is paying the legal expenses of Ukraine and 
Honduras[31]. The Australian Health Secretary has further indicated that she believes that BAT 
lawyers have attended consultation meetings between the Australian government and the 
disputing governments[32]. The Ukrainian Prime Minister, Arseniy Yatseniuk, has reportedly 
stated that Ukraine initiated its (now suspended) dispute with Australia “at the request of the 
American Chamber of Commerce”[33]. WTO disputes might thus be seen as part of a broader 
strategy by TTCs which involves also disputes initiated directly by them under the provisions of 
BITs and through national legal systems.  
A few final remarks are in order. First, despite the fact that our data clearly show that 
opposition within the WTO to tobacco control policies is moving away from high-income 
countries towards low(er)-income countries, not all developed countries are pro tobacco control. 
In fact, leadership and support for tobacco control in the TBT Committee or TRIPS Council 
comes from just a handful of high-income WTO members – in particular, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and Norway. So, on the side of developed countries, “the coalition of the willing” 
is not very extensive and economic and political heavyweights like the US, Japan and the EU are 
not actively backing tobacco control policies within the WTO context and sometimes even 
openly oppose such policies[34, 35]. However, it is important to mention in this regard that, 
within the WTO context, the European Commission represents the EU and individual EU 
member states do not express their own opinion. This means that the EU’s position is usually a 
compromise between those member states in favour and those against stricter tobacco control 
policies. In other words, despite the fact that the EU as a whole may not be actively supporting - 
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or at times may even oppose - tobacco control policies within the WTO, individual EU countries 
may nevertheless be supportive of tobacco control initiatives.  
Second, just as we do not suggest that all developed countries are in favour of tougher 
tobacco control polices, we also do not argue that all developing countries are against them. 
Some low(er) income countries in fact openly and consistently support tobacco control policies 
during debates within WTO committees. Most active in this regard are Brazil and Uruguay, 
which is in line with their broader policies to restrict tobacco use. Brazil has “for the past two 
decades…been at the forefront of global tobacco control initiatives”[36], while Uruguay’s 
tobacco control strategy was labelled “world leading” by a recent report from the International 
Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project[37].  
Third, we should mention three caveats to our findings. For one thing, our analysis is 
based on a limited number of cases during a rather short period of time. To be sure, we looked at 
discussions in the TBT Committee and TRIPS Council from 1995 until 2013 and GATT/WTO 
Disputes for the entire 1947-2103 period, yet tobacco related issues only became a frequently 
debated issue in the last few years, which in turn means that our conclusion that there is “a shift” 
from high income to low(er) income countries should be treated with some caution. Moreover, it 
is difficult to ascertain the extent of political influence of TTCs over low(er)-income countries 
using methods previously proven to be effective, such as analysis of internal company 
documents, since we lack access to such documents for the post-FCTC period. Finally, in our 
analysis we have treated all tobacco related issues and disputes as equally important in the sense 
that we simply coded all issues/disputes raised within the WTO as either ‘being’ or ‘not being’ 
about tobacco control. We acknowledge that this has limitations to the extent that such an 
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approach does not allow us to distinguish between those issues and disputes that are very 
relevant to tobacco control and those that are perhaps only partially relevant. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Our data demonstrate an increase in disputes and discussions at the WTO related to tobacco 
control in the post-FCTC period and a clear shift towards lower-income countries opposing 
tobacco control policies. The lack of a clear pattern of economic interests among the 
complaining parties in the important dispute with Australia, and the legal and financial assistance 
provided by TTCs to those parties, suggests that TTCs are exerting influence over trade policy. 
Whilst previous research using tobacco industry documents has revealed past TTC influence in 
some of the countries currently in dispute with Australia, including Honduras[38], Ukraine[39] 
and Indonesia[40], more research is needed to understand current forms of industry influence 
over trade policy.  
 
WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS 
• The number of WTO disputes involving tobacco control policies has increased in the 
post-FCTC period. 
• Nearly all countries opposing tobacco control policies in the WTO in the post-FCTC 
period are low or middle income countries. 
• TTCs have an incentive to influence the governments of low and middle income 
countries to oppose tobacco control via the WTO.  
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Table 1 Tobacco and cigarette disputes in the GATT and the WTO  
Year* Complainant Defendant Issue raised by complainant Dispute# 
GATT disputes 
1979 United States Japan Japanese Restraints on Imports of 
Manufactured Tobacco from the United 
States 
L/5140 
1989 United States  Thailand Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes 
DS10/R 
1993 Group of nine 
countries** 
United 
States 
Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal 
Sale and Use of Tobacco 
DS44/R 
WTO disputes 
2001 Chile Peru Taxes on Cigarettes DS227 
2003 Honduras Dominican 
Republic  
Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Cigarettes  
DS300 
2003 Honduras Dominican 
Republic 
Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes 
DS302 
2008 Philippines Thailand Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines 
DS371 
2010 Indonesia United 
States 
Measures Affecting the Production and Sale 
of Clove Cigarettes  
DS406 
2010 Ukraine Armenia Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes and Alcoholic 
Beverages 
DS411 
2012 Ukraine Australia Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks 
and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging  
DS434 
2012 Honduras Australia Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging  
DS435 
2012 Dominican 
Republic 
Australia Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging  
DS441 
2013 Cuba Australia Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging  
DS458 
2013  Indonesia Australia Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging 
DS467 
* The year when a request for consultations from the complainant was received by the WTO.  
** These countries were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Table 2 Examples of texts indicating positions of WTO Member States in TBT Committee and 
TRIPS Council 
Opposed: The representative of Zimbabwe said that, while her delegation appreciated New 
Zealand's efforts to protect the health of consumers, it shared the concerns expressed by the 
Dominican Republic and other delegations regarding tobacco plain packaging. The measures 
were inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement and would impair Members' benefits.  
Supported: The representative of Uruguay said his delegation wished to reiterate its position 
regarding the legitimacy of plain packaging measures for tobacco products under WTO rules. 
He said that public health protection was unquestionably part of state sovereign competence and 
each country could legislate in favour of the public good. New Zealand had undertaken to 
comply with its international obligations while adopting these measures it considered necessary 
to defend public health interests, and Uruguay was fully satisfied with the explanations and 
justifications that had been given by New Zealand in that respect. He said that Article 20 of the 
TRIPS Agreement provided that there should not be any undue complication of trademark use 
with specific requirements. In that respect New Zealand's application of measures intended to 
control tobacco consumption on its territory could not be considered as violating TRIPS as these 
measures were more than justified.  
Other: The representative of Switzerland said that his delegation was supportive of public 
health measures, including in the area of anti-smoking. Such health measures, as any other 
government measures or national legislation, needed to be compatible with international 
obligations, including the substantive provisions of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, as explicitly 
provided for public health measures by its Article 8.1. Accordingly, such measures had to be 
appropriate to reach the objective pursued, which meant that they had to be proportionate and 
effective. He said Switzerland encouraged New Zealand to take these principles duly into 
account in its legislative work for the new measures to ensure their compliance with the 
substantive TRIPS obligations. 
Source: Minutes #72 of TRIPS Council, March 2013  
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Table 3 Issues with greatest number of WTO members raising concerns at TBT Committee 
(1995-2013). Tobacco control issues indicated in bold.  
Date* Trade concern Number of 
members raising 
concerns  
 
Oct 2013 European Communities - Regulation on the Registration, 
Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH)   
34 
Mar 2011 Canada – Bill C-32 amendment to Tobacco Act  29 
Jun 2011 European Communities – Regulation on Classification, 
Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 
(ATPs and CLP)  
26 
Jun 2012 Brazil - Draft Resolution No. 112, 29 November 2010; 
maximum levels of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide 
permitted on tobacco products and prohibition of 
additives  
23 
Jun 2012 Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011  22 
Mar 2012 European Communities – Directive 2002/95/EC on the 
Restriction of the Use of certain Hazardous Substances in 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) and Directive 
2002/96/EC on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(WEEE)  
13 
Nov 2012 European Communities – Regulation on Certain Wine 
Sector Products  
13 
Jun 2011 European Communities – Regulation on Certain Wine 
Sector Products  
13 
Oct 2013 European Union - Tobacco products, nicotine 
containing products and herbal products for smoking. 
Packaging for retail sale of any of the aforementioned 
products  
13 
Mar 2002 Belgium – Draft Law aiming at Promoting Socially 
Responsible Production  
12 
Oct 2013 Chile - Proposed amendment to the Food Health 
Regulations, Supreme Decree No. 977/96  
12 
Jul 2003 United States – Bioterrorism Act  10 
Oct 2013 New Zealand - Proposal to introduce plain packaging 
of tobacco products in New Zealand  
10 
Mar 2012 Thailand – Health warnings for alcoholic beverages  9 
Oct 2013 Ireland - Proposal to introduce standardised/plain 
packaging of tobacco products in Ireland  
9 
* The indicated date is when the issue was last raised. 
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Figure 1 Frequency of intervention in TBT Committee or Trips Council on tobacco control 
related issues by development status (1995-2013) 
 
 
HI = High Income; UMI = Upper Middle Income; LMI = Lower Middle Income; LI = Low Income 
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Figure 2 Percentage of specific trade concerns at TBT Committee related to tobacco  
(among those ever speaking in favour or opposed to tobacco) by development status (1995-2013) 
 
 
HI = High Income; UMI = Upper Middle Income; LMI = Lower Middle Income; LI = Low Income 
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